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Abstract 
This article focuses on geographic communities as fields in which human-made and natural 
events occasionally disrupt the lives of organizations. We develop an institutional perspective to 
unpack how and why major events within communities affect organizations in the context of 
corporate philanthropy. To test this framework, we examine how different types of mega-events 
(the Olympics, the Super Bowl, political conventions) and natural disasters (such as floods and 
hurricanes) affected the philanthropic spending of locally headquartered Fortune 1000 firms 
between 1980 and 2006. Results show that philanthropic spending fluctuated dramatically as 
mega-events generally led to a punctuated increase in otherwise relatively stable patterns of 
giving by local corporations. The impact of natural disasters depended on the severity of 
damage: while major disasters had a negative effect, smaller-scale disasters had a positive 
impact. Firms’ philanthropic history and communities’ intercorporate network cohesion 
moderated some of these effects. This study extends the institutional and community literatures 
by illuminating the geographic distribution of punctuating events as a central mechanism for 
community influences on organizations, shedding new light on the temporal dynamics of both 
endogenous and exogenous punctuating events and providing a more nuanced understanding of 
corporate-community relations. 
 
Keywords: communities, natural disasters, mega-events, punctuated equilibrium, corporate 
philanthropy, institutional theory 
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The rhetoric of globalization suggests a decline in the significance of local communities for 
social and organizational behavior (Giddens, 1990; Sorge, 2005). Theorists have noted the 
emergence of the “ageographical city” (Sorkin, 1992) and the “transcendence of place” by 
“social organization that [spans] cities, states, and nations” (Coleman, 1993: 7). Organizational 
researchers, too, have shifted attention from local communities to “non-local events and ideas” 
(Scott, 2005: 474). In institutional research, in particular, the geography-independent 
organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) has emerged as the primary focus of analysis 
(Scott, 2001). Despite these developments, a growing body of research suggests that, even in a 
global age, local communities maintain a significant enduring influence on organizations 
(Freeman and Audia, 2006; Marquis and Battilana, 2009). For example, geographic communities 
have persistent traditions (Molotch, Freudenberg, and Paulsen, 2000), identities (Romanelli and 
Khessina, 2005), legal regulations (Guthrie et al., 2008; Tilcsik, 2011), and relational systems 
(Kono et al., 1998), which in turn have longstanding effects on local organizations’ strategies 
(Lounsbury, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2010), governance (Davis and Greve, 1997; Marquis, 
2003), innovation (Saxenian, 1994), and corporate social practices (Galaskiewicz, 1997). 
Research in this area has highlighted how the enduring institutional features of local 
communities affect organizations. 
 
Yet, while this literature suggests that geography matters mostly through the influence of 
longstanding local conditions, it has largely neglected another critical way in which geographic 
location shapes organizations. Geographic communities not only constitute stable local contexts 
with persistent institutional features but are also sites of natural and human-made events that 
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occasionally punctuate the stability of the local institutional field. Organizations in, say, Atlanta 
or New Orleans are shaped not only by their longstanding embeddedness in a local institutional 
environment but also by the experience of major events, such as the 1996 Olympics (Glynn, 
2008) or Hurricane Katrina. Because punctuating events are geographically distributed, 
community location matters by determining organizations’ differential exposure to the dramatic 
impact of major events. 
 
Researchers have long recognized that events—conceptualized as “shocks” (Fligstein, 1990), 
“discontinuities” (Lorange, Scott Morton, and Ghoshal, 1986), or “jolts” (Meyer, 1982)—
represent a key source of change in fields. Prior work, however, has mostly focused on events in 
geography-independent fields centered around a market, a technology, or a political or legal 
issue (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; Hoffman, 1999; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). In 
contrast, considering how punctuating events are geographically distributed harkens back to the 
original model of punctuated equilibrium (Eldredge and Gould, 1972). A core idea in that 
model—which was lost when it was imported into the social sciences—is that geographic 
location plays a significant role in determining which populations are subject to abrupt changes 
at a given time (Eldredge and Gould, 1972; Gould, 1980). We bring this idea to organization 
theory and elaborate it by considering both endogenous and exogenous punctuations, the 
associated temporal dynamics, and events of different magnitudes. 
 
We demonstrate the theoretical value of our perspective in the context of corporate philanthropy, 
examining the effect of major human-made and natural local events on the charitable 
contributions of Fortune 1000 firms between 1980 and 2006. Prior research has shown corporate 
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philanthropy to be an excellent context in which to develop organizational theory (Galaskiewicz, 
1985, 1997; Marquis and Lee, 2013), and given that corporate social practices in the U.S. are 
strongly oriented toward the community in which the focal firm is headquartered (e.g., Guthrie, 
2003; Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007), philanthropy provides a particularly useful lens to 
understand the impact of local events and the associated social-normative processes. To highlight 
variation in event effects, we focus on the consequences of two important but fundamentally 
different types of events: (1) mega-events (such as the Olympics and national political 
conventions), which are actively solicited by communities and hence “arise from the endogenous 
capabilities of [local] fields” (Glynn, 2008: 1138), and (2) natural disasters, which represent 
exogenous destructive shocks to communities. While both these types of events affect a local 
social-normative system and the philanthropic spending of locally headquartered firms, there is 
likely to be important variation in the nature and temporal dynamics of these effects by event 
type and across different communities and organizations. 
 
LOCAL EVENTS AND CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
Our focus on local events highlights the importance of considering geography and events in 
tandem; only by recognizing organizational phenomena as both “emplaced” (Gieryn, 2000) and 
“eventful” (Sewell, 2005)—that is, as both situated in a particular geographic location and 
potentially transformed by significant events—can we understand the full scope of institutional 
dynamics. Fields form not just around markets, technologies, and issues, but also around 
geographic communities (Warren, 1967), and significant events in a community affect the local 
social-normative landscape and can become an important source of organizational change. 
Because even the most globally oriented organizations are rooted in the organizational field of 
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some headquarters location (Marquis, Davis, and Glynn, 2013), and because events are catalysts 
for change in fields (Lampel and Meyer, 2008), focusing on local events provides a deeper 
understanding of field dynamics that influence organizations. 
 
Communities, Mega-events, and Disasters 
We define a firm’s local community as the metropolitan region in which its headquarters is 
located (Marquis, 2003; cf. Marquis, Lounsbury, and Greenwood, 2011). This definition has 
significant precedent because a firm’s headquarters community is where most of its key 
executives reside (Palmer, Friedland, and Singh, 1986) and “look to the actions of other locally 
headquartered companies for standards of appropriateness” (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007: 
927). Further, the headquarters community is particularly influential for corporate philanthropic 
contributions, which we define as charitable monetary donations—including donations in areas 
such as the arts, education, housing, health, social welfare, and the environment, among others, 
but excluding political contributions and commercial sponsorship (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 
2007). Prior research has shown that philanthropic spending tends to be highly concentrated 
locally (Useem, 1988; Kanter, 1997), with 70 to 80 percent of donations typically staying in the 
headquarters city (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Guthrie, 2003). This fact underlies our research question: 
given the local focus of corporate giving, what happens to the philanthropic behavior of local 
firms when a major event disrupts the life of a community? To address this question, we focus on 
mega-events, which are actively solicited, and natural disasters, which represent destructive 
exogenous shocks to communities. 
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Mega-events are large-scale cultural, political, athletic, and commercial events that attract 
significant media attention (Roche, 2000). We focus on three mega-events that are hosted at the 
community level: the Summer Olympics, the Super Bowl, and the Democratic and Republican 
presidential nominating conventions. The Olympics represents one of “the most visible rituals 
dramatizing the world polity” (Boli and Thomas, 1997: 41), the Super Bowl is the most popular 
annual sporting event in North America, and national conventions are among the most important 
political events in the U.S. In contrast to these actively solicited events, a natural disaster is a 
naturally occurring physical event with major unwanted consequences on a human population 
(Alexander, 1993). These include climatic events (e.g., floods and hurricanes) and geological 
ones (e.g., earthquakes and volcanic eruptions). 
 
Both actively solicited events and destructive exogenous events can have important social-
normative consequences, bringing to the fore pressures and opportunities for philanthropic 
contributions by locally headquartered firms. In particular, both mega-events and disasters can 
potentially strengthen the salience of local needs and identity and give rise to new normative 
expectations in a community, leading to an increase in corporate donations. Although this is 
likely to be a general trend, there should be important variation across events, organizations, and 
communities, and there may be countervailing processes that sometimes reverse this trend. 
 
Community Mega-events and Corporate Philanthropy 
There are two major ways in which community mega-events affect the philanthropic 
contributions of local firms. As prior research indicates, such events have a potential to increase 
the salience of local identity and needs as well as to strengthen connections between local 
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corporations and the main recipients of their charitable giving—local nonprofits. 
 
First, prior research suggests that mega-events can increase the salience of local identity, 
community needs, and community expectations regarding philanthropy. Early theorists noted 
that “place” and associated events—such as public ceremonies and rituals—are key mechanisms 
that foster social solidarity and identification with the collective (Tönnies, 1887; Durkheim, 
1965). Consistent with this classic insight, recent research has noted the potential of community 
mega-events to foster civic pride and create a sense of unity in the host community (e.g., Truno, 
1995; Waitt, 2001). As a nonprofit manager remarked about Detroit’s preparation for the Super 
Bowl, “It is changing the attitude of people within the city. There is a sense of pride. You can 
feel it” (Maynard, 2006). Accordingly, mega-events may foster an increased sense of citizenship 
among local corporate actors and help make community development goals more salient (Hiller, 
2000; Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying, 2001). The Olympic Games in Atlanta, for example, 
“served as a restraint on some of the commercialism” of local corporations, many of which came 
to adopt a “statesmanlike” approach in their relationship to the community even in commercial 
matters (Glynn, 2008: 1133). Simultaneously, mega-events help highlight social issues in the 
host community and encourage local actors to take action, as community needs frequently 
become an important theme in local public discourse before a mega-event (Misener and Mason, 
2009). In parallel, community leaders might actively solicit event-related charitable contributions 
from local corporations (Schwartz, 1997). Moreover, as small-scale charity events associated 
with mega-events shine the spotlight on local needs and nonprofits, they create pressures and 
opportunities for corporate philanthropy (Kott, 2005; Babiak and Wolfe, 2006). 
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Related to the salience of community identity and local needs, a characteristic of communities 
with high levels of corporate philanthropy is the presence of strong and dense connections 
between local firms and local nonprofits (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991). 
Strong links between corporations and nonprofits put corporations directly in touch with social 
needs and expectations in the community, creating strong normative pressures for philanthropic 
giving. One common example of such connections is the presence of corporate managers on 
local nonprofit boards. As Galaskiewicz (1997: 468) noted in his study of the Twin Cities, 
“stories were told about a new CEO in town who at first would slash the contributions budget but 
then suddenly increase contributions the next year, having served his first term on a prominent 
cultural board. It was in these arenas that executives were solicited for contributions [and] 
socialized into local culture.” Such connections to local nonprofits likely foster greater 
philanthropy not only because corporate managers connected to nonprofits affect their own 
firm’s giving but also because they influence other local corporations to which they are socially 
connected (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007). Accordingly, research shows that nonprofits that 
rely primarily on donations grow faster if they have ties to local elites, in part because such ties 
facilitate access to funding through informal means, such as normative appeals for help 
(Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Dowell, 2006). As Marquis, Glynn, and Davis (2007: 936) 
concluded, one of the “key elements of local social normative systems that cultivate an 
environment that promotes high levels of local corporate social action . . . is dense connections 
between local nonprofits and corporations.” 
 
Mega-events, in turn, can strengthen local corporate-nonprofit connections. Preparations for 
mega-events involve the creation of temporary transorganizational structures (Anand and 
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Watson, 2004)—such as task forces and host city committees—that bring together otherwise 
disconnected actors from the local corporate and nonprofit sectors. Likewise, smaller-scale 
philanthropic events that accompany mega-events provide settings for corporate donors and 
nonprofits to come together (e.g., Babiak and Wolfe, 2006), helping to cultivate mutual 
awareness and bonds that may last beyond the mega-event. Mega-events might also spur the 
emergence of new civic coalitions that coalesce from local networks of corporate and nonprofit 
actors (Hiller, 2000; Glynn, 2008). Thus community mega-events can provide a temporary social 
infrastructure to forge and strengthen links between local companies and nonprofits. As a result, 
because such links promote high levels of local corporate social action (Marquis, Glynn, and 
Davis, 2007), mega-events likely have a positive effect on the philanthropic contributions of 
local firms. The effect of mega-events, however, is likely to be subject to temporal dynamics 
such that the processes discussed above will lead to event effects before, during, and after 
community mega-events. 
 
Temporal Dynamics of Mega-event Effects 
Pre-event effect. Through the mechanisms discussed above, mega-events can exert a significant 
effect on communities and resident organizations even before they take place. First, prior 
research suggests that preparations for a mega-event may promote a focus on local identity 
(Glynn, 2008), community needs (Hiller, 2000), and pressures for local corporate giving 
(Schwartz, 1997). Sydney residents, for example, reported strong feelings of community arising 
from the prospect of hosting the Olympics even when the games were still years away (Waitt, 
2001), and, more than half a decade before it took place, the 2012 London Olympics had already 
created opportunities for “Londoners [to] come together around particular representations of 
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themselves and the city” (Newman, 2007: 255). Likewise, it is during the pre-event preparatory 
phase that local leaders begin to seek out local event-related corporate contributions (Schwartz, 
1997). Moreover, with regard to corporate-nonprofit connections, preparations for a mega-event 
require “a multitude of diverse community actors and institutions to coordinate . . . with each 
other within the urban field” (Glynn, 2008: 1118), and this coordination begins well before the 
event takes place (Hiller, 2000). Thus in anticipation of mega-events, temporary 
transorganizational structures and new civic coalitions that foster corporate-nonprofit linkages 
emerge. As a result, the general mechanisms we propose begin to operate in advance of an event: 
even before a mega-event begins, it can bring together local corporate and nonprofit actors and 
increase the salience of local identity, needs, and pressures for corporate giving. Hence we 
predict that—relative to years that do not immediately precede or follow, or coincide with, the 
local hosting of a mega-event—there will be an increase in philanthropic giving in years that 
lead up to such events. 
 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): In the years immediately preceding a community mega-event, there will 
be an increase in the philanthropic contributions of locally headquartered corporations. 
 
Same-year effect. By the time of the event itself, new connections between local actors, such as 
corporations and nonprofits, will have emerged (Hiller, 2000), and the event will have reached 
its potential to foster a sense of community (Truno, 1995) and a focus on community needs in 
local public discourse (Misener and Mason, 2009). Moreover, in the event year, charity events 
that accompany the main event provide an additional forum for corporate-nonprofit interactions, 
and local needs move into the public spotlight at such events (Babiak and Wolfe, 2006). Thus 
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based on the above-described mechanisms, we predict an increase in giving in the event year. 
 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): In years when a community hosts a community mega-event, there will be 
an increase in the philanthropic contributions of locally headquartered corporations. 
 
Post-event effect. Event-related increases in local firms’ philanthropic contributions could be 
either ephemeral or persistent (cf. Stinchcombe, 1965). We expect, however, that community 
mega-events will have a potential post-event effect on local firms’ philanthropic spending but 
that this effect will likely taper off over time. This argument is based on two observations. On 
the one hand, consistent with the arguments of event organizers who extol the enduring legacy of 
mega-events, prior research suggests that organizational relationships formed during the 
planning and execution of a mega-event may persist even years after the event takes place 
(Glynn, 2008). Thus even if the event itself loses its salience and begins to fade from memory 
soon, newly forged local corporate-nonprofit links can last beyond the immediate aftermath of 
the event. In turn, as noted earlier, such links help increase and enforce the normative level of 
corporate giving. On the other hand, scholars have suggested that there are limits on the potential 
of a single event to trigger radical long-term changes in organizations and their relationships 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). In fact, researchers have noted that early-established patterns of 
organizational relationships can persist even in the face of subsequent shocks (Marquis, 2003). 
Thus, following a mega-event, local nonprofits and corporations are eventually likely to return to 
their regular relational patterns (Glynn, 2008). Accordingly, we predict a post-event increase in 
local firms’ charitable giving but expect it to weaken with time. 
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Hypothesis 1c (H1c): In the years immediately following a community mega-event, there will 
be an increase in the philanthropic contributions of locally headquartered corporations, but this 
increase will taper off with time. 
 
Magnitude of Natural Disasters and Corporate Philanthropy 
While mega-events are actively solicited, often because they are perceived as catalysts for 
community development, natural disasters strike exogenously, causing death and injury, as well 
as physical and economic damage. These destructive events can also have an effect on the 
philanthropic contributions of local corporations. Prior findings point to conflicting hypotheses. 
On one hand, several scholars have documented high levels of solidarity and altruism in the 
wake of disasters—a phenomenon described as “post-disaster utopia,” “altruistic community 
phase,” or “post-crisis benevolence” (Erikson, 1976; Kaniasty and Norris, 2004). According to 
this research, as communities coalesce around relief and rebuilding efforts, a local esprit de corps 
emerges, causing a rise in helping behaviors, such as donations and volunteering. A similar 
phenomenon might also occur at the firm level, given that the executives of local firms reside in 
the community. As Crampton and Patten (2008: 865) noted, being headquartered in a community 
creates a “sense of connection between the people that make up the firm and those affected by 
the disaster,” which in turn leads to “pressure on the company to respond.” 
 
On the other hand, the negative effects of disasters may offset the above-described mechanisms. 
First, because disasters cause significant physical and economic damage, they may limit the 
philanthropic capacity of local firms. As Crampton and Patten (2008: 863) argued, “even in the 
wake of catastrophic events, corporate philanthropic giving is constrained by economic 
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concerns.” As a result, local firms may be more preoccupied with the impact of the disaster on 
their own operations than with philanthropic disaster response, as was the case, for example, 
during Hurricane Katrina (see Muller and Kräussl, 2011). More important, even if a locally 
headquartered firm has few local facilities, there are compelling reasons to expect a reduction in 
charitable giving. In particular, major disasters may compromise not only the philanthropic 
capacity of individual firms but also the overall philanthropic infrastructure of the community. If 
a major disaster causes the key nonprofit partners of local firms to dissolve or to suspend their 
activities, the community network of local philanthropy—through which donations normally 
flow—may be severely damaged. For example, nearly half a year after Hurricane Katrina, the 
majority of nonprofits in the area were still not fully operational; many of these organizations 
lost physical assets and staff, as well as board members that used to connect them to local firms. 
As a result, many local nonprofits—the primary recipients of donations by locally headquartered 
firms—remained largely incapacitated and unable to raise or use donations for months to come 
(Auer and Lampkin, 2006). Moreover, concerns about particularly damaging disasters may be 
elevated to a national or even international level, leading to philanthropic response from well 
beyond the affected community (Muller and Whiteman, 2009). In that case, as a wider group 
assumes responsibility for the philanthropic response, the pressure on local organizations to 
champion rebuilding efforts lessens. 
 
Given the above arguments, it is unclear whether natural disasters will elevate or depress the 
level of philanthropic spending by local firms. Our discussion above suggests that the answer 
may depend on the magnitude of the disaster. The more damaging a disaster, the more likely it is 
to undermine the local philanthropic infrastructure and to attract a philanthropic response from 
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outside the community. Thus, while the most damaging disasters will have a negative effect on 
local firms’ philanthropic contributions, smaller-scale disasters will leave the philanthropic 
network of the community intact and put local firms at the forefront of disaster response. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The effect of natural disasters on the philanthropic contributions of locally 
headquartered firms will depend on the severity of damage caused. Highly destructive disasters 
will have a negative effect; relatively less damaging disasters will have a positive effect. 
 
Although we expect punctuating events to influence the charitable giving of locally 
headquartered firms, not all firms will be affected equally. The magnitude of an event’s effect 
will depend on the moderating influence of both organizational and community characteristics 
that capture critical aspects of the relationship between firms and communities. As implied in our 
discussion of hypothesis 2, however, the most damaging disasters likely create relatively weaker 
public pressures on local firms to increase their philanthropic spending, so the strength of such 
pressures, and firms’ sensitivity to them, will be less relevant than for positive event effects. 
Thus we focus our discussion of moderators on positive event effects, which stem from mega-
events and small-scale disasters. 
 
Organizational Susceptibility to Community Demands 
At the organizational level, two key factors affect both the extent to which a company faces 
public expectations—including community demands—regarding its philanthropy and the extent 
to which it is sensitive to such expectations: (1) the firm’s prior history of giving and (2) the 
consumer orientation of its primary industry. These factors not only play a key role in shaping 
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corporate philanthropic behaviors (e.g., Burt, 1983; Lev et al., 2010) but also reflect a critical 
aspect of the relationship between a firm and its headquarters location, affecting the degree to 
which the firm is susceptible to demands that arise in the community. 
 
Prior history of philanthropy. Previous research has shown the importance of a company’s 
history of corporate social behaviors for its current behaviors (Godfrey, 2005; Muller and 
Kräussl, 2011), but a firm’s history of philanthropy could affect its response to local punctuating 
events in different ways. On the one hand, there may be reasons to expect that a history of 
generosity will limit the positive effects of community events on a firm’s giving. Companies 
with a solid track record of charitable behaviors might have built up a reservoir of public 
goodwill (Peloza, 2006), which could reduce pressures for philanthropic contributions during 
local mega-events and disasters. The managers of companies with low prior giving, by contrast, 
may view such events as a one-off opportunity to mend their firm’s philanthropic reputation 
(Muller and Kräussl, 2011). On the other hand, however, there are compelling reasons why firms 
with a high level of past contributions should be particularly responsive to major community 
events. Recent research suggests that firms with highly visible philanthropic and other corporate 
social activities and aspirations tend to face increased public demands and media coverage (Luo, 
Meier, and Oberholzer-Gee, 2012). These great expectations and scrutiny, in turn, likely compel 
such firms to be generous when major events punctuate the life of their headquarters community. 
In the case of disasters, for example, Muller and Kräussl (2011: 914) pointed out that a key 
motivation to engage in corporate philanthropic responses is “to maintain a preexisting 
reputation for responsibility.” Failure to respond to a major community event or a small-scale 
disaster might have damaging consequences because corporate reputations “require steady, 
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incremental investments in CSR [corporate social responsibility] over time but are easily lost” 
(Muller and Kräussl, 2011: 914) in the spotlight of highly publicized events. Qualitative 
evidence supports these arguments, suggesting that major community events create high 
expectations for locally based firms known for their prior philanthropic involvement. As a 
manager interviewed by Bertels and Peloza (2008) put it, “People know us and expect us to be 
involved in the community. When there are major events going on, if we want to be seen as a 
member of this community we need to take part. I don’t mean to say we write a blank check, but 
we never say no.” A history of corporate generosity should strengthen the positive effects that 
local punctuating events, in particular, mega-events and small-scale natural disasters, have on 
firm giving. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The positive effect of mega-events and small-scale natural disasters on 
corporate giving will be stronger among firms with a prior history of large philanthropic 
contributions. 
 
Consumer orientation. While we expect firms with a strong history of charitable activities to 
face greater public demands and scrutiny regarding their philanthropy, similar attention might be 
directed at firms that operate in industries in which the predominant customers are individual 
consumers rather than firms. As a long line of research shows, firms in industries such as 
consumer goods and personal services are more sensitive to public perception about their 
philanthropy and have a greater incentive to appear charitable than companies that produce 
primarily for industrial use, such as business services and capital goods (Burt, 1983; Lev et al., 
2010; but see Galaskiewicz, 1997). Given this heightened sensitivity to public perception, the 
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visibility and public demands generated by major local events may exert a stronger positive 
influence on charitable giving by corporations in industries that depend on consumer sales than 
firms in industries in which reputation among individual customers plays little role. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The positive effect of mega-events and small-scale natural disasters on 
corporate giving will be stronger among firms that operate in industries in which the 
predominant customers are individuals rather than other firms. 
 
Community Characteristics 
Although organizational factors are important in understanding the impact of events, the 
magnitude of an event’s effect will likely depend not only on the characteristics of firms but also 
on the features of their community. Two community factors—network cohesion among local 
firms and the economic strength of the community—are likely to interact with community events 
in shaping corporate giving. Although distinct, both these factors capture the strength of 
influence that a community exerts on locally headquartered firms. 
 
Network cohesion among local corporations. Scholars have long recognized that a crucial 
feature of geographic communities is the extent to which their constituent members are 
connected by cohesive social networks that foster pressures toward conformity (Warren, 1967; 
Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden, 1978). There is compelling evidence, in particular, that 
cohesive interfirm networks in a community create normative environments for organizations, 
leading them to act in ways that are socially appropriate in the local context (Davis and Greve, 
1997; Marquis, Davis, and Glynn, 2013). Most relevant for our framework is the notion that 
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local intercorporate network cohesion creates social pressure for conformity with public 
expectations in the community regarding philanthropy (e.g., Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1991, 1997) 
and enables mobilization around a common focus by maintaining communication channels 
among community business leaders (Glynn, 2008). Thus in tight-knit local business 
communities, there are strong pressures both to meet public expectations and to keep up with 
other locally based firms. In such communities, if an event triggers an initial increase in 
philanthropic spending even just by some firms that are leading the way, its overall effect on 
giving is likely to be stronger than in communities that lack dense ties among corporate elites. As 
a senior executive put it, “We see what the big boys [in the community] are doing. . . . we need 
to keep some sort of pace. If you are not pulling your weight, it looks bad” (Bertels and Peloza, 
2008: 64). By contrast, in a disconnected local business community—in which social pressures 
and the potential for coordinated action are weaker—firms that would lead the way in responding 
to events easily remain without followers. These arguments suggest that positive event effects 
will be greater in communities with stronger network cohesion among locally headquartered 
firms. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The positive effect of mega-events and small-scale natural disasters on 
corporate giving will be stronger in communities with greater network cohesion among local 
corporations. 
 
Economic strength of the community. Political economy perspectives on urban development 
emphasize the role of economic dependence in community-corporate relations (Friedland and 
Palmer, 1984; Logan and Molotch, 1987). This line of work suggests that if an urban community 
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is more dependent on the presence of corporations than vice versa—for instance, because it is a 
community with a weak economy (e.g., DiGaetano, 1989)—then, “rather than the city being able 
to hold the corporation as hostage . . . the corporation [will] hold the city hostage” (Molotch and 
Logan, 1984: 495). In such cases, the community will be in a relatively weak position to coax 
charitable donations from local firms when mega-events or disasters bring local needs to the 
fore. Consistent with this argument, a long line of research suggests that communities with a 
weak local economy tend to provide benefits (e.g., subsidies or tax abatements) to corporations 
rather than coax contributions (e.g., taxes or charitable donations) from them for community 
causes (e.g., Rubin and Rubin, 1987; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999). Thus political economy 
perspectives suggest that our hypothesized positive event effects might be greater in 
communities with a strong local economy than in communities with a weak economic position. 
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The positive effect of mega-events and small-scale natural disasters on 
corporate giving will be greater in communities with a stronger local economy. 
 
METHODS 
Our primary data source was the National Directory of Corporate Giving (Foundation Center, 
1981-2007), a comprehensive database of corporate philanthropy published in every even-
numbered year since 1980, which created a unique opportunity to test our hypotheses. Using 
these data, we constructed a sample of Fortune 1000 corporations in each of the even-numbered 
years between 1980 and 2006. Given that this sample does not include corporations smaller than 
the Fortune 1000, our empirical results reflect the behavior of relatively large firms. Yet because 
donations by the largest few hundred firms account for the preponderance of total corporate 
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giving in the U.S. (Cavicchio and Turok, 2008; Coady, 2008), our focus on Fortune 1000 firms’ 
giving patterns has significant relevance for the overall phenomenon of corporate philanthropy. 
 
Given a small number of missing observations (< 3 percent), our complete sample consisted of 
13,583 firm-years. The Fortune lists include both public and private firms but data are not 
readily available for some of our control variables for some private firms in COMPUSTAT (such 
as financial performance indicators). Thus most of our main models (which included such 
controls) used a sample of 11,769 firm-years, including 2,571 firms in 157 metropolitan areas. 
To ensure that these missing data did not bias our findings, we reestimated all models without 
control variables but with firm, year, and community fixed effects on the full sample of 13,583 
firm-years. The results of theoretical interest that we report below remained substantively 
unchanged under the full sample, confirming that the missing data on some control variables did 
not threaten the robustness of our conclusions. 
 
Main Variables 
For each sampled firm in each year, we used the National Directory of Corporate Giving to 
record philanthropic contributions, defined as the total dollar amount of grants given to charity 
either through a corporate foundation or directly by the corporation.1 Consistent with our 
conceptual definition of philanthropic contributions, this variable included charitable monetary 
                                                
1 It would have been ideal to include only donations in the corporate headquarters community, but data are only 
consistently available to capture firms’ total philanthropic contributions. Although numerous prior studies on the 
topic show that the vast majority of corporate philanthropy is within the headquarters community (e.g., Useem, 
1988; Kanter, 1997; Galaskiewicz, 1997; Guthrie, 2003), we acknowledge this as a potential weakness. 
Nevertheless, while this measurement issue may lead to the loss of some precision, it should make the estimates, if 
anything, more conservative. As our supplementary analyses demonstrate, we find highly similar patterns when 
examining how events affect donations received by nonprofits in the headquarters community. 
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donations but excluded political contributions and commercial sponsorships. To correct for 
skewed values, we log-transformed this variable (+1). 
 
We defined the geographic bounds of communities using core-based statistical areas (CBSAs). A 
CBSA is a “core area containing a large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities 
having a high degree of economic and social integration with that core” (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010). We then used the New York Times archives to create dummy variables indicating whether 
a given type of mega-event occurred in a company’s community in the previous years, in the 
same year, or in the following years. Because the Olympics and national conventions always take 
place in even years, and our data consisted of even years only, we could not examine the effect 
of these events in the immediately preceding (t-1) or immediately following (t+1) year. Thus our 
pre-event and post-event indicators for the Olympics and national conventions used two-year 
lags, capturing whether each of these events occurred in a community in year t+2 or t-2. For the 
Super Bowl, we were able to use one-year lags in our main analysis; we found highly similar 
results when using two-year lags. 
 
For data on natural disasters, we relied on impact estimates by the National Climatic Data Center 
(2010) and the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (2010). Before conducting 
our analyses, we defined three categories of natural disasters based on the extent of economic 
damage. In disaster research, it is common to use damages of at least $1 billion as a minimum 
threshold to define significant disasters (e.g., Miskel, 2006; Cook et al., 2007). Thus we defined 
small-scale disasters as those with damages below this threshold. Then we identified the top 25 
percent of billion-dollar disasters based on damages and labeled these as major disasters, a 
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definition that corresponds to a $5 billion minimum threshold. Finally, we categorized disasters 
that fell between these two extremes—damages above $1 billion but below $5 billion—as 
medium-scale disasters. All definitions used 2007 dollars. We examined the sensitivity of results 
to alternative definitions (based on different monetary thresholds and human casualties), which 
yielded conclusions identical to those of our main analyses. 
 
We measured a company’s history of philanthropy (H3) as its annual average of charitable 
contributions (logged) at t-4 and t-2. As a sensitivity check, we estimated models with alternative 
measures: (1) using longer periods to define philanthropic history (e.g., average contributions in 
t-6, t-4, and t-2); (2) using only t-4 or only t-4 and t-6 to define the moving window; and (3) using 
measures of past philanthropy adjusted for firm size. In all these cases, we found results 
substantively similar to those reported below. We categorized industries as having an individual 
consumer focus (H4) using a classification by Lev et al. (2010), who distinguished industries in 
which the primary customer is the individual (e.g., consumer goods, personal services) and in 
which the predominant customer is industry (e.g., business services, capital goods). The 
categories are based on firms’ four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, which 
identify the line of business best representative of the company as listed in COMPUSTAT. 
 
To measure network cohesion among local firms, we gathered data on the interlock network of 
shared directors among corporate boards. Board interlock networks constitute a key mechanism 
for information transmission and norm enforcement among firms in a community (Mizruchi, 
1996; Davis and Greve, 1997). Our measure of local network cohesion (H5) was the reverse of 
the community’s external-internal index, based on a network cohesion measure developed by 
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Krackhardt and Stern (1988). This variable measured the ratio of locally headquartered firms’ 
board interlocks within the community to their interlocks outside the community (Marquis, 
2003). Thus this variable captured the prevalence of internal over external ties—the extent to 
which local firms had directors who also served on the boards of other local firms. We obtained 
these data from Compact D/SEC. We obtained consistent interlocks data for public firms, 
cleaned extensively to ensure accuracy, for 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002, which yielded 152,466 
director-year observations. Although it would be ideal to have these data for each year, extensive 
research suggests that the characteristics of these networks at the community level remain stable 
over time (Mizruchi, 1996). Our own analyses indicated high correlations even between the 2002 
and the 1987 values of the internal-external ratio at the community level. Thus, in line with 
Davis and Greve (1997) and Palmer and Barber (2001), we gave observations values from the 
closest year for which interlocks data were available. Because we did not observe interlocks in 
the early 1980s, we ran our analysis without observations from 1980 and, for robustness, ran 
alternative models with only post-1986 observations. The results remained highly similar under 
these alternative models. Moreover, our conclusions remained substantively unchanged when 
excluding relatively small local corporate networks (e.g., communities with fewer than five 
locally headquartered firms) from the analysis. 
 
Finally, we created two variables to capture the economic strength of communities: (1) municipal 
revenues generated in the community (local government revenue; from the Census of 
Governments) and (2) total personal incomes in the community. In our main analysis, we used 
the former; our results remained highly similar when using the latter. 
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Control Variables 
To rigorously control for unobserved factors, our analyses included firm, community, and year 
fixed effects. This approach controlled for all the organizational, industry, and community 
characteristics that did not vary during our time period and for the effects of all common shocks 
and trends. Crucially, the community fixed-effects controlled for all enduring local 
characteristics—such as stable network patterns, norms, and physical geography—that have been 
at the center of prior research. We also controlled for time-variant factors. At the organizational 
level, we controlled for sales (logged), earnings (in billions of dollars), returns on assets (ROA), 
and number of employees (logged), as well as firm age (in logged years).2 These data were from 
COMPUSTAT. When testing H3, it was also necessary to control for the focal firm’s capacity 
for philanthropic giving because an alternative interpretation may be that firms with a history of 
generosity have greater capacity (e.g., greater funds) for philanthropy. To do so, we used data 
from the National Directories of Corporate Giving on firms’ corporate foundation assets 
(logged), reflecting the extent of funds, staff, and other resources dedicated to philanthropy 
(Marquis and Lee, 2013). At the community level, we collected data on population size (logged) 
and real per capita income (in thousands of dollars) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and, 
to capture the extent to which local governments outsource social service provision to nonprofits, 
we controlled for local government revenue and the political affiliation of the state’s governor 
(Republican governor) (Salamon, 1987). Finally, we used Domhoff’s (1998) list to construct an 
indicator of the presence of exclusive upper-class social clubs in the community. Such clubs are 
                                                
2 This helps avoid collinearity problems when controlling for year-specific effects with year dummies. Because of 
collinearity, using years, rather than logged years, to measure age would make it impossible to include all year 
dummies that would normally be in the model. Nevertheless, all coefficients of interest are very similar in their 
direction and significance regardless of whether age is measured in years (with some year dummies dropped from 
the models) or in log years (with year fixed-effects included in the models).	  
 25 
key settings for interaction among local corporate elites (Kono et al., 1998; Marquis, 2003) and 
affect the level of corporate support for nonprofits (Marquis, Davis, and Glynn, 2013). 
 
Statistical Model, Endogeneity Concerns, and Robustness Checks 
Our data were organized in a pooled cross-sectional time-series format, with multiple 
observations per firm over time. To account for this fact and to control for all time-invariant 
heterogeneity across firms, we employed fixed-effects models. Thus the coefficients represent 
within-firm effects over time. To account for multiple observations per firm, we used cluster-
adjusted, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Stock and Watson, 2008). Finally, we 
addressed the unbalanced nature of our data, that is, the fact that not all firms were observed in 
all years (e.g., due to the death or downsizing of some firms). We conducted a set of standard 
econometric tests and found no evidence of selection bias due to this issue.3 
 
Fixed effects. We took several steps to address potential endogeneity concerns and to verify the 
robustness of our results. While our time-variant controls capture potentially relevant changes 
over time (for instance, in the size or economic situation of firms and cities), our fixed-effects 
approach controls for all—including unobserved—steady differences between firms and between 
headquarters locations, including all stable aspects of the geographic, cultural, social, and 
political landscape of communities. Hence our statistical approach does not compare charitable 
giving, for example, by firms in Chicago and firms in Oklahoma City; rather, it compares a given 
firm’s philanthropic contributions at different points in time (e.g., in the year of a particular event 
                                                
3 These tests involve adding to our models various selection indicators that capture (1) whether a firm in panel t was 
also included in panel t-1, (2) whether a firm was observed over all time periods, or (3) the total number of periods 
in which a firm was observed (e.g., Verbeek, 2008). As these indicators were insignificant, we did not find evidence 
for selection bias. As an additional test, we also used Heckman’s (1979) approach to test for sample selectivity on 
waves of the panel as separate cross sections, which yielded the same basic conclusion. 
 26 
versus other periods). Thus the possibility that one city might be more likely to host mega-events 
or experience natural disasters than another would not affect our main analysis. 
 
Reverse causality. We used numerous tests to rule out reverse causality. First, we ran 
community-level cross-sectional probit analyses, predicting the likelihood of hosting mega-
events as a function of corporate giving by local firms and community size (see Rose and 
Spiegel, 2011). The coefficient on corporate giving was insignificant throughout (p > .40), 
suggesting that communities with more generous local firms were not more likely to host mega-
events. Second, we used multi-episode event history models and found that, after controlling for 
community size, giving by local firms in years t-5 to t-1 did not predict event hosting in year t. 
Third, we compared philanthropic trends in cities that bid for hosting rights to those in which the 
event eventually took place. This analysis of actual hosts versus short-listed candidates should 
provide an apples-to-apples comparison (Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti, 2008). Thus we 
compared donations by locally headquartered firms in Super Bowl host cities, candidate cites, 
and non-candidate cities.4 As noted below, firms in these three types of cities had similar levels 
of giving before the event; however, in the event year, a marked increase in philanthropy 
occurred only in host cities. This suggests that our results were driven by the occurrence of 
mega-events (rather than just bidding) and that events drove giving, rather than vice versa. 
 
Triangulation: Received contributions. Our main analyses focused on philanthropic donations 
given by firms. Yet if our underlying theory is correct, we should also observe similar patterns 
                                                4 We collected accurate and comprehensive data on all failed bids made during the finalist stage of voting for the 
Super Bowl. While similar data exist for the Olympics, there was only one unsuccessful U.S. Olympic bid during 
our period of interest, rendering a systematic analysis difficult. Comprehensive data on national convention bids are 
unavailable, particularly in the first half of our sampling period.	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when analyzing contributions received by local nonprofits. Thus we tested the implications of 
our core hypotheses (H1 and H2) at the community level as well, regressing contributions 
received by local nonprofits on event indicators, fixed effects, and controls. We collected data 
for this supplementary analysis from the National Center for Charitable Statistics.5 As reported 
below, this analysis revealed patterns highly similar to those of our primary models. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. Most correlations are relatively low. 
Nevertheless, we conducted regression diagnostics to examine the variance inflation factor 
associated with our variables and found that multicollinearity did not pose a significant threat. 
Table 2 presents tests of hypotheses 1 and 2. 
[Insert tables 1 and 2 about here] 
The Effect of Mega-events 
In table 2, models 1-3 separately examine the effect of each mega-event. Models 7 and 8, on 
which we base most of our core conclusions, include all events simultaneously, estimating the 
net effect of different events in different periods. The conclusions that emerge from models 7 and 
8 are notably similar. The difference between these regressions is that model 8 is estimated 
without control variables—but with various fixed effects—in order to include the full sample of 
13,583 firm-years. Our findings of theoretical interest were robust to this sample. Finally, model 
9 presents our community-level analysis of philanthropic contributions received by local 
nonprofits.6 The fact that donations given by locally headquartered firms (models 7 and 8) and 
                                                
5 The relevant database, known as the Statistics of Income, is based on annual IRS filings by all 501(c)(3) operating 
nonprofits above a minimum size threshold (see, e.g., Boris and Steuerle, 2006; Marquis, Davis, and Glynn, 2013). 
6 Because these data were available from 1987 to 2002, we did not have a sufficient number of community-level 
observations of Olympic Games to include the Olympics in these supplementary analyses.  
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contributions received by local nonprofits (model 9) exhibit highly similar patterns provides 
additional evidence for our overall framework. 
 
Pre-event effect. Our results point to the potential of some mega-events to exert an ex-ante 
influence on philanthropy, but only in some cases (H1a). Models 7 and 8 indicate that the net 
pre-event increase in corporate giving was the largest for the Olympics, an effect that is 
significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test). We find no similar effect for national conventions 
and the Super Bowl, however. One possibility is that this difference is due to the significantly 
larger scale of the Olympics and the attendant mobilization effort.7 Thus our results provide only 
partial support for the ex-ante impact of mega-events. 
 
Same-year effect. Model 7 provides strong support for H1b, indicating a positive same-year 
effect of the Olympics and the Super Bowl. These effects are significant both statistically and in 
a practical sense. As the confidence intervals around our coefficients are wide, it may be 
misleading to infer the magnitude of effects from point estimates. Thus we calculated effect sizes 
using a conservative approach based on the smallest value in each 95-percent confidence 
interval. Using this cautious method, based on the more conservative model 7, we estimate the 
same-year effect of the Olympic Games and Super Bowls to be roughly 30 percent and 10 
percent, respectively. As discussed below, these similar findings across different event types 
indicate the generality of our model connecting local events and corporate giving. 
                                                                                                                                                       
For Super Bowls, national conventions, and different disaster types, however, this supplementary analysis shows 
patterns of coefficient sign and significance highly similar to our primary (firm-level) models.	  
7 Another possibility was that our pre-event dummies, which were lagged by just one or two years, did not capture 
pre-event effects that had occurred even earlier. To investigate this possibility, we created event dummies lagged by 
3 patterns of coefficient sign and significance 10 years for each type of mega-event. In a series of fixed-effects 
models, we examined the coefficients for these dummies but found no systematic pre-event effects on philanthropic 
spending. 
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Post-event effect. Both models 7 and 8 support H1c, showing a significant post-event increase 
from the Olympics and national conventions and indicating similarly large practical effects as 
those in the event year. We further explore post-event effects in table 3. Although the positive 
effect of the Olympics weakened over time, it remained detectable for six years (models 11 and 
13). The post-convention increase in local corporate giving, which model 7 has shown to exist 
two years after the event, does not seem to persist much longer than that. These findings confirm 
that the post-event increase in local firms’ donations tapers off with time, rather than changing 
philanthropic behavior in the long run. Again, that these effects exist to varying degrees for local 
events as diverse as the Olympics and political conventions strengthens the generality of our 
framework. Figures 1a–1c provide illustrative examples of the impact of mega-events. For each 
community in each year, these figures show the locally headquartered Fortune 1000 firms’ total 
corporate philanthropic contributions divided by these firms’ total sales. Thus these figures 
depict changes in the average level of philanthropic giving by local corporations, adjusted for 
firm size. 
[Insert table 3 and figures 1a - 1c about here] 
 
The Effect of Natural Disasters 
Hypothesis 2 predicted a negative effect in the case of severely damaging natural catastrophes 
and a positive effect in the case of smaller-scale disasters. We find support for this prediction. In 
table 2, both models 7 and 8 suggest that highly destructive disasters had a negative effect on 
charitable giving among locally headquartered firms, while small-scale disasters had a positive 
effect. Both these effects were most pronounced in the year after the disaster, perhaps because 
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many disasters in the U.S. are hurricanes and other storms, which tend to occur late in the year, 
with their effects potentially spilling over into the next year. Standing between these two 
extremes, medium-scale disasters had no measurable impact. The same patterns emerged from 
our community-level analysis (model 9), showing that the most damaging disasters were 
associated with a reduction in the overall level of donations to local nonprofits, while small-scale 
disasters were associated with an increase. 
 
Organizational and Community Moderators 
Uncovering the moderating influence of organizational and community factors, table 4 presents 
tests of the interaction effects predicted in hypotheses 3–6. To avoid multicollinearity problems, 
these interaction analyses focused on same-year effects as well as those pre-event and post-event 
effects for which we found evidence in our tests of H1 and H2.8 In models 15 and 16, which 
tested the organization-level moderators (H3 and H4), we included these interactions for all 
mega-events and small-scale disasters. In models 17 and 18, which tested the community-level 
moderators (H5, H6), we did not include the Olympics—the least frequent mega-event in our 
sample—to ensure a sufficient number of observations for every interaction. 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
We find some support for H3 and H5, as nearly half of the tested positive event effects were 
significantly greater for firms with a high level of past contributions (H3), and half of the tested 
positive effects were stronger in communities with a higher degree of network cohesion (H5). 
The result for H3 was also robust to controlling for corporate foundation assets, a measure of 
philanthropic capacity (model 15). In other words, firms without a strong history of prior giving 
                                                
8 Additional analyses, in which interaction terms were entered one by one, or in smaller groups than in table 4, led to 
substantively similar conclusions as those for our main models. 
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and those located in communities with a less cohesive corporate network tended to have a 
relatively muted positive response to events. These findings are consistent with qualitative 
evidence suggesting that major community events foster particularly great expectations for local 
firms known for their history of philanthropy and that the pressures for philanthropy brought by 
events might be amplified in tight-knit local business communities (Bertels and Peloza, 2008). 
 
At the same time, we find little evidence for the other two moderator hypotheses. Operating in an 
industry with an individual consumer focus (H4) or in an economically strong community (H6) 
did not consistently strengthen the positive event effects. Although somewhat surprising, the lack 
of evidence for H4 is in line with Galaskiewicz’s (1985, 1997) previous finding that dependence 
on consumer sales is not a consistent predictor of philanthropic behaviors. The lack of support 
for H6, in turn, suggests that the positive event effects occurred in both strong and weak local 
economies; thus it was differences in local network cohesion, rather than economic weight, that 
drove community-level variation.9 
[Insert table 5] 
Robustness Checks 
As noted above, we conducted a variety of robustness checks such as using different definitions 
to define disaster thresholds or running community-level analyses of received donations, and 
these analyses supported our main findings. As explained in the Methods section, one important 
additional analysis was the comparison of philanthropic giving in Super Bowl host cities, 
candidate cites, and cities that neither hosted nor bid for the event. Table 5 presents some of 
these results. Models 19 and 20 include variables indicating whether the focal firm was located 
                                                
9 In supplementary analyses, we found that firm age and size did not consistently moderate the effects of mega-
events and natural disasters, suggesting that these events affect the philanthropic spending of firms both large and 
small and old and young.	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in a community that was a host or an unsuccessful bidder for an upcoming Super Bowl. Firms in 
communities that did not bid for a Super Bowl during the relevant period constitute the reference 
category. This analysis suggests that, prior to the event, there were no significant differences in 
the level of philanthropy across firms headquartered in host cities, candidate cities, and non-
candidate cities. Post-estimation tests show that the host and candidate pre-event coefficients 
were indistinguishable from each other and from zero (i.e., the non-bidders). We came to the 
same conclusion when estimating these effects at t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4, and t+5 separately. In the 
event year itself, however, the clear increase in giving that we observed in our main models only 
occurred in the host cities, as indicated by the coefficient on same-year hosting (model 20). Thus 
we observed similar philanthropic patterns across hosts, candidates, and non-candidates prior to 
the Super Bowl, but hosts’ patterns diverged sharply in the event year, even in comparison with 
candidates. These results suggest that our core result in this case is robust even when evaluated 
vis-à-vis candidate cities and that the hosting of mega-events drove philanthropic trends, rather 
than the reverse. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study contributes to the institutional and community literatures by showing that 
communities shape organizations not simply because of their enduring features but also because 
punctuating events are geographically distributed, which allows communities to play a critical 
role in determining organizations’ exposure to major events. In particular, we studied how 
punctuating events within communities affected the philanthropic contributions of locally 
headquartered corporations in the U.S. between 1980 and 2006. Three main findings emerged. 
First, we not only documented that actively solicited mega-events exerted a positive effect in the 
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event year, but we also revealed more complex temporal dynamics. In some cases, the effects on 
corporate philanthropy were visible two years prior to the event and lasted up to six years, before 
eventually tapering off. Second, as we predicted, the impact of destructive exogenous events was 
contingent on their magnitude: while major natural disasters depressed philanthropic spending by 
local corporations, smaller-scale disasters stimulated it. Third, we found that organizational and 
community factors—capturing organizations’ susceptibility to philanthropic expectations and the 
strength of community influences on firms—moderated some of the event effects. Taken 
together, these findings offer several theoretical contributions: they demonstrate the theoretical 
utility of an emplaced and eventful perspective, highlight the importance of temporal dynamics 
and magnitude in understanding punctuating events, and shed light on the role of punctuating 
events in recursive institutional processes. Further, our findings challenge basic assumptions 
about the stable nature of corporate giving and provide balance to the literature on corporate-
community relations, suggesting that some punctuating events create opportunities for 
communities to influence corporations in ways that benefit the local nonprofit sector, even if 
some firms remain unresponsive to such influence. 
 
An Emplaced and Eventful Perspective 
In recent years, organizational scholars have revived interest in the effects of local geography 
and argued that, despite increasing globalization, local factors have remained critically important 
in understanding organizations and their actions. Thus an important element of our perspective is 
the notion that organizational fields can form around local communities (Warren, 1967; Marquis, 
Glynn, and Davis, 2007), rather than just markets, technologies, or issues (Hoffman, 1999). 
Building on this insight, we advance the literature on communities and institutions by 
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highlighting a basic mechanism for local influences that is fundamentally different from the 
mechanisms identified in most prior research. We show that communities matter not only as 
relatively stable contexts with persistent features but also as sites of rare events that occasionally 
punctuate this stability. Thus geographic location not only determines enduring institutional 
conditions but also demarcates which organizations are exposed to the impact of different 
punctuating events. Communities matter both as sites of persistence and as sites of punctuation. 
 
This conclusion demonstrates the value of juxtaposing emplaced and eventful theoretical 
approaches. A simultaneously emplaced and eventful perspective recognizes that social 
phenomena are constituted through a particular geographic location (Gieryn, 2000) and, at the 
same time, “takes into account the transformation of structures by events” (Sewell, 2005: 100). 
This juxtaposition has enabled us to provide insights that we could not have developed 
otherwise. A sole focus on geographic location would have highlighted stable community 
influences but would have missed the impact of events; an eventful but un-emplaced approach 
would have emphasized the role of events in non-local fields—for example, at the industry or 
national level—but would have missed the local nature of key events. Neither approach would 
have predicted the dramatically fluctuating patterns that we observed; only by recognizing the 
simultaneous importance of events and geography could we identify these previously 
unrecognized patterns, which in turn have major implications for understanding the dynamics of 
events and fields, institutional recursivity, and the nature of corporate social practices. 
 
Events and Fields: Temporal Dynamics and Event Magnitude 
Prior research has shown that significant events, such as regulatory changes (e.g., Fligstein, 
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1990), catastrophes (e.g., Hoffman, 1999), or other highly publicized dramatic events (e.g., 
Meyer, 1982; Pride, 1995), can trigger organizational change in fields. Our focus on events in 
communities goes beyond this work in a number of ways. First, we bring to the analysis of social 
phenomena a key insight from the original theory of punctuated equilibrium in the natural 
sciences. As Eldredge and Gould (1972) emphasized, rapid events of change take place within 
particular geographic boundaries, rather than affecting populations across the board; therefore 
change stems from the “differential… deployment of these punctuations” to populations located 
in different areas (Gould, 1980: 184). We developed this insight in a social context to show that 
communities influence organizations because punctuations are geographically distributed. 
Further, as we elaborated this insight, we highlighted the importance of considering both the 
temporal dynamics and the magnitude of punctuating events. 
 
Second, a unique aspect of our framework is its emphasis on how a single event may shape 
organizational behavior at three distinct temporal stages: before, during, and after the event. The 
first part of our theorizing focused on pre-event effects and suggested that preparation for a local 
mega-event can increase the salience of local identity and needs and strengthen the local 
corporate-nonprofit network even before the event occurs. Accordingly, we documented 
substantial pre-event changes in philanthropic giving in case of the Olympics. Although the 
Olympics were still years away, the prospect of the games had a significant effect on the 
behavior of locally headquartered firms. In prior research, both institutional and strategy scholars 
focused mostly on what happens during and after punctuating events (Romanelli and Tushman, 
1994; Lampel and Meyer, 2008). The possibility that the organizational consequences of an 
event might predate the event itself by a significant amount of time has remained largely 
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unrecognized. Although researchers have noted that there might be proactive organizational 
changes in anticipation of possible future environmental shifts (Nadler and Tushman, 1995; 
Drazin, Glynn, and Kazanjian, 2003), their models focused on the role of anticipation in 
adjustment and did not consider specific changes that occur in advance of punctuating events. In 
contrast, our results suggest that an important aspect of some punctuating, field-configuring 
events (Lampel and Meyer, 2008) might be that they can trigger changes even before they take 
place. At the same time, we only detected an ex-ante philanthropic surge in case of the 
Olympics. On the one hand, this result is consistent with the extensive community efforts 
necessary to stage the Olympics; on the other hand, this finding also suggests that significant pre-
event changes occur only in some circumstances. 
 
Moreover, we found that local corporations continue to make larger philanthropic contributions 
even after the event in question has occurred. That significant mega-events would lead to 
fundamental transformations is consistent with the rhetoric of event promoters and organizers, as 
well as organizational theories that emphasize the potential of major institutional shifts to create 
permanent change (Stinchcombe, 1965; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). In the case of the 
Olympics, for example, the notion of the “Olympic Legacy”—referring to lasting changes in the 
host city—“has become an integral and institutionalized part of this event” (Glynn, 2008: 1123). 
As we observed, however, the surge in corporate giving did not become permanent; at most, the 
effects of the Olympics were detectable six years later. An intriguing question for future research 
is why such changes persist for a while and then fade away, with firms eventually returning to 
their pre-event patterns of giving. With regard to the mechanisms we propose, these findings 
may relate to the episodic nature of corporate-nonprofit linkages. Because funding relationships 
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are sometimes multi-year, there is perhaps a natural expiration to some of the connections that 
are established as a result of a mega-event. We encourage future research on the various 
mechanisms whereby post-event effects may last, including the philanthropic agreements that 
firms might enter in the wake of major events. 
 
Complementing our focus on mega-events, our analysis of natural disasters contributes to 
understanding the importance of event magnitude in punctuated change processes. Most research 
in this area has essentially treated such events dichotomously, comparing organizational 
outcomes under the occurrence and nonoccurrence of events. In contrast, our findings suggest 
that disruptive exogenous events may be more fruitfully viewed as occurring along a continuum 
and may exert very different effects depending on their strength. Though less severe disasters 
had a positive effect, highly destructive disasters had a negative effect. Crucially, had we treated 
natural disasters dichotomously, we might have inferred no relationship between disasters and 
our dependent variable. Furthermore, conceived in this way, our mega-event findings also shine 
light on the importance of an event’s magnitude. The Olympics, arguably the mega-event with 
the greatest magnitude in our sample, exerted the strongest pre-event and post-event effects. 
Considered together, these findings suggest that there is a complex relationship between the 
strength of different types of events and the resultant organizational actions. Thus a critical 
question is not just whether an event of a given type occurs but what its magnitude is. Prior 
research has shown that the effect of an event might vary across organizations (Meyer, 1982) and 
historical contexts (Hoffman, 1999). By highlighting another contingent factor, an event’s 
magnitude, we push research in a new direction to understand the complex dynamics of events 
and organizational responses. 
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[Insert figure 2 about here] 
At a more general level, figure 2 presents a typology of our findings organized along the above-
discussed theoretical dimensions—event type and event magnitude—showing how these factors 
interact to shape the nature and temporal dynamics of an event’s effects. This typology is one 
step toward a more nuanced conception of how the consequences of events unfold. As noted, 
while punctuating events have received much attention in several fields (e.g., Romanelli and 
Tushman, 1994; Lampel and Meyer, 2008), there is only a limited understanding of how the 
effects of these events manifest themselves at different temporal stages. As our results indicate, 
this inattention might obscure important event effects and variation in their timing. 
 
Although our typology sheds light on how the basic characteristics and magnitude of events 
shape their consequences at distinct periods, we also recognize that some aspects of our setting 
may limit generalizability. First, our organizational outcome of interest, philanthropic giving, 
depends particularly strongly on social-normative processes (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007); 
thus we encourage future researchers to examine how local punctuating events affect other 
organizational decisions and behaviors. Second, while a strength of our investigation is that it 
includes several different types of events, future work might further elaborate our typology in the 
context of other punctuating events, drawing on our distinctions between exogenous and 
endogenous events, high- and low-magnitude events, and the three basic temporal stages of event 
effects. 
 
Finally, to increase confidence in our findings, we considered alternative explanations based on a 
strategic view of philanthropy as a marketing activity. Consistent with strategy-based 
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explanations (e.g., Porter and Kramer, 2002), as a mega-event draws attention to the host 
community, it might temporarily increase the marketing value of corporate giving, but there are 
several reasons why strategic considerations cannot fully account for our results. First, we 
documented effects on philanthropy even years after some of the events ended. Arguments about 
heightened visibility during mega-events cannot account for this result. Second, there is often a 
much more direct and visible way than charitable donations to shine in the spotlight of a mega-
event: commercial sponsorship of the event itself (Glynn, 2008)—a type of marketing 
expenditure that is distinct from philanthropy. Third, our moderator results do not readily mesh 
with a strategic explanation; for example, a purely strategy- or marketing-focused perspective 
could not readily explain why local interfirm network cohesion strengthens some of the event 
effects and why individual consumer orientation does not. 
 
Endogenous Events and Institutional Recursivity 
As noted above, a key element of our theorizing is a distinction between exogenous and 
endogenous events. Much research has focused on exogenous jolts, but our analysis of mega-
events has revealed key aspects of events that arise at least partly endogenously from community 
fields. This analysis contributes to institutional theory, not only by uncovering the temporal 
dynamics of event effects but also by highlighting the recursive relationship between events and 
fields. On the one hand, prior research has documented the effect of local factors on a 
community’s chances of hosting a mega-event (Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying, 2001; 
Glynn, 2008). On the other hand, our results suggest that these events themselves may affect 
local social-normative processes that underlie corporate giving. Thus there is a recursive 
dimension to the processes at play: mega-events are partially products of local conditions, but 
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their influence feeds back to affect local organizations. As Glynn (2008: 1138) speculated, “there 
may be a circularity to field-configuring events such that they arise from the endogenous 
capabilities of fields but, once in place, function through relational and symbolic systems to 
change those systems.” We find support for this conjecture. Although our dependent variable 
captures an outcome of local social-normative systems, rather than those systems themselves, our 
findings are consistent with the notion that a punctuating event can significantly affect actors in 
the field from which it arose in the first place. Thus, by identifying partly endogenous events as 
cases of institutional recursivity, we contribute to institutional theory, which has been criticized 
for paying only scant attention to recursive processes (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Hirsch, 1997). 
We emphasize that such processes may manifest themselves in organized, public events and play 
out in local fields. More generally, while extant theory has focused on recursivity between 
institutional conditions and agents (Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992), we point to the recursive 
dimension of punctuating events. 
 
Corporate Social Practices and Corporate-community Relations 
Numerous scholars have called for research that shifts attention from the financial impact of 
corporate social practices to their antecedents and examines the effect of events (Margolis and 
Walsh, 2003) and communities (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007) on corporate social 
behaviors. By focusing on events within communities, we have developed a broader 
understanding of local influences on corporate social practices. While prior work focused on how 
corporate social involvement depends on the “ongoing vibrancy of business-civic connections 
that pervades some communities year after year” (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007: 940), we 
revealed how punctuating events intensify or dampen that vibrancy, causing significant 
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fluctuations in giving. More generally, our work contributes to research on corporate-community 
relations (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Marquis, Davis, and Glynn, 2013). While some of this literature 
has focused on how corporations extract benefits from communities (e.g., Logan and Molotch, 
1987), we suggest that, through public expectations associated with local punctuating events, a 
community might influence locally headquartered companies in a way that benefits the 
community and its nonprofit sector, at least temporarily. Yet not all communities are equally 
capable of exerting such demands, nor are organizations equally susceptible to them. Firms with 
little prior giving experience and those in communities with a less cohesive corporate network 
were less susceptible to pressures for increased contributions, indicating that philanthropic 
responses depend not only on the nature of events but also on individual firms’ histories and 
local network structures. 
 
Conclusion 
Even in a global age, local communities represent a critical context for organizational behavior. 
This study highlights an important but understudied aspect of that context: local punctuating 
events. In so doing, this paper speaks not only to the organizational literature on communities 
and institutions but also to a broader literature on place—a physical, geographic location that is 
invested with meaning and value. Theorists increasingly call for an exploration of how place 
matters for social phenomena, and thus far, most responses to this question have focused on how 
place “stabilizes and gives durability to social structural categories,” “arranges patterns of face-
to-face interaction that constitute network-formation,” and “embodies and secures otherwise 
intangible cultural norms, identities, memories” (Gieryn, 2000: 473). We emphasize a different 
social mechanism by which place matters: the geographic distribution of punctuations that 
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interrupt the life course of local actors. The English language is expressive in this regard. When 
an event occurs, it takes place—it prevails in a particular locale, introducing its own dynamics. 
We hope our study will stimulate more research into how such dynamics affect organizations. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Philanthropic contributions 6.974 7.008                   
2. National convention at t+2 .024 .153 .01         
3. National convention at t .041 .198 .02 -.03        
4. National convention at t–2 .037 .188 .01 -.03 -.04       
5. Olympics at t+2 .005 .071 .02 -.01 -.01 -.01      
6. Olympics at t .005 .069 .01 -.01 -.01 -.01 .00     
7. Olympics at t–2 .005 .068 .00 -.01 -.02 -.01 .00 -.01    
8. Super Bowl at t+1 .013 .113 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 .00 -.01 .49   
9. Super Bowl at t .014 .118 .02 .00 -.02 .03 .34 -.01 -.01 -.01  
10. Super Bowl at t–1 .013 .114 -.03 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.01 .39 -.01 -.01 -.01 
11. Major disaster at t .025 .156 -.01 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 
12. Major disaster at t–1 .022 .147 -.03 -.03 .02 .06 -.01 -.01 -.01 .00 -.02 
13. Medium disaster at t .039 .194 -.01 .08 -.04 .03 .19 -.01 -.02 -.01 .07 
14. Medium disaster at t–1 .046 .210 -.02 .01 -.02 -.05 -.01 .18 -.02 -.02 .10 
15. Small-scale disaster at t .113 .317 -.03 -.02 -.05 .11 .11 .12 .06 .07 .00 
16. Small-scale disaster at t–1 .131 .337 -.03 .00 .01 .13 -.02 .10 -.03 .06 -.05 
17. History of philanthropy 7.449 6.637 .76 .00 .01 .01 .02 .01 .00 -.02 .02 
18. Consumer orientation .554 .497 .07 .02 .02 .00 -.02 -.03 -.01 .01 -.04 
19. Local network cohesion .258 .173 .04 .06 .05 .04 .04 .05 .05 .03 .08 
20. Local government revenue 15.957 1.506 .06 .21 .22 .18 .02 .06 .08 .10 .04 
21. Foundation assets 6.636 7.432 .81 .01 .02 -.01 .02 .01 .00 -.02 .01 
22. Age 2.610 1.001 .22 .02 .01 .03 -.01 .01 -.02 -.01 -.02 
23. Sales 7.901 1.153 .27 .05 .06 .05 .02 .01 .00 -.02 .02 
24. Earnings .306 1.593 .16 .03 .03 .06 .01 .00 .00 -.02 -.01 
25. ROA .041 .438 .05 .00 -.01 .01 .02 .01 .01 -.01 .00 
26. Employees 2.712 1.085 .24 .04 .03 .02 .02 .02 .03 .01 -.01 
27. Population 14.325 1.245 .05 .19 .21 .18 .02 .07 .08 .09 .05 
28. Per capita income 34.614 7.878 .03 .05 .07 .08 -.02 -.04 -.03 -.05 -.02 
29. Republican governor .548 .498 .04 -.04 -.03 .07 -.05 .02 .01 .07 .00 
30. Upper-class social club .498 .500 .13 .16 .19 .17 .04 .06 .07 .05 .10 
            
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
          
12. Major disaster at t–1 -.02 .03          
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13. Medium disaster at t -.02 .18 .01         
14. Medium disaster at t–1 .20 .04 -.04 .17        
15. Small-scale disaster at t .04 -.02 -.04 .19 .00       
16. Small-scale disaster at t–1 .19 .01 .03 .17 .30 .11      
17. History of philanthropy -.02 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.04 -.01     
18. Consumer orientation -.01 -.02 -.05 -.06 -.05 -.05 -.05 .07    
19. Local network cohesion .04 .06 -.03 .07 .06 .06 .07 .03 .02   
20. Local government revenue .11 .04 .04 .04 .10 -.01 .10 .06 .04 .39  
21. Foundation assets -.03 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.03 -.04 -.04 .71 .10 .03 .05 
22. Age -.01 .00 -.01 -.04 -.02 -.05 -.01 .26 -.05 .00 .10 
23. Sales -.02 -.01 .07 .02 .06 .01 .03 .28 .03 -.09 .14 
24. Earnings -.01 -.01 .04 .00 .02 -.02 .04 .17 .05 -.02 .09 
25. ROA .00 .00 -.01 .00 .01 .00 -.02 .04 .03 -.01 -.01 
26. Employees .01 -.01 .01 -.01 .01 -.04 .00 .25 .13 -.02 .15 
27. Population .10 .04 .07 .04 .10 .03 .12 .06 .03 .38 .98 
28. Per capita income -.06 -.04 .09 -.01 .11 -.05 .06 .03 -.05 -.13 .27 
29. Republican governor .08 .09 -.05 -.02 .08 -.05 .03 .06 .00 .01 .08 
30. Upper-class social club .05 .04 .07 .07 .06 .09 .11 .14 .01 .48 .68 
            
Variable 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29   
22. Age .18           
23. Sales .24 .21          
24. Earnings .15 .08 .41         
25. ROA .05 .03 .08 .21        
26. Employees .24 .25 .73 .28 .07       
27. Population .04 .08 .18 .10 -.01 .15      
28. Per capita income -.02 .05 .27 .16 .03 .11 .30     
29. Republican governor .03 .05 .07 .05 .00 .03 .09 .13    
30. Upper-class social club .10 .10 .09 .06 -.01 .09 .69 .06 .04     
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Table 2. Fixed-effects Models Predicting Philanthropic Contributions (H1, H2)* 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9† 
Mega-events (pre-event)          
Olympics at t+2 1.54•      1.63• 1.50•  
 (.72)      (.82) (.74)  
National convention at t+2  .06     .04 .02 .02 
  (.29)     (.23) (.28) (.08) 
Super Bowl at t+1   .58    .070 .33 -.02 
   (.52)    (.60) (.55) (.06) 
Mega-events (same year)          
Olympics at t 1.53•      1.83• 2.10••  
 (.71)      (.76) (.70)  
National convention at t  .05     .09 .10 .18• 
  (.25)     (.25) (.24) (.08) 
Super Bowl at t   .83•    .90• .86• .11• 
   (.40)    (.42) (.39) (.06) 
Mega-events (post-event)          
Olympics at t–2 1.54•      1.87• 1.40•  
 (.69)      (.76) (.70)  
National convention at t–2  .54•     .56• .50• .14• 
  (.25)     (.25) (.24) (.07) 
Super Bowl at t–1   .23    .48 .36 -.03 
   (.47)    (.50) (.47) (.06) 
Natural disasters          
 Major disaster at t    -.59   -.31 -.25 -.02 
    (.32)   (.33) (.31) (.04) 
 Major disaster at t–1    -.67•   -.68• -.65• -.09• 
    (.33)   (.33) (.32) (.04) 
Medium disaster at t     .34  .32 .23 -.02 
     (.26)  (.27) (.25) (.03) 
Medium disaster at t–1     .06  -.02 -.07 -.00 
     (.25)  (.27) (.25) (.04) 
Small-scale disaster at t      .14 .03 -.05 .04• 
      (.17) (.18) (.17) (.02) 
Small-scale disaster at t–1      .23 .35• .29• .07••• 
      (.16) (.16) (.14) (.02) 
Controls          
Age .97••• .96••• .96••• .97••• .97••• .96••• .97•••   
 (.17) (.17) (.17) (.17) (.17) (.17) (.17)   
Sales .59•• .59•• .59•• .59•• .59•• .59•• .59••   
 (.20) (.20) (.20) (.20) (.20) (.20) (.20)   
Earnings .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04   
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)   
 ROA .08 .08 .09 .08 .08 .08 .08   
 (.11) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.11)   
Employees .49• .50• .50• .50• .50• .50• .50•   
 (.21) (.21) (.21) (.21) (.21) (.21) (.21)   
Population 1.31 1.41 1.29 1.48 1.28 1.38 1.55  .98••• 
 (1.04) (1.04) (1.04) (1.04) (1.04) (1.04) (1.05)  (.11) 
Per capita income .04 .05 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04  .01••• 
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 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)  (.00) 
Local government revenue -.39 -.49 -.44 -.45 -.47 -.44 -.44  .33••• 
 (.66) (.66) (.66) (.66) (.66) (.66) (.67)  (.04) 
Republican governor .01 .02 .03 .02 .04 .03 .04  -.02 
 (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12)  (.01) 
Upper-class social club -1.36 -1.40 -1.24 -1.79 -1.08 -1.53 -1.99   
 (5.72) (5.72) (5.72) (5.73) (5.72) (5.73) (5.74)   
Constant -12.26 -12.47 -11.81 -13.72 -11.34 -12.72 -14.59 10.49• .28 
 (12.21) (12.22) (12.20) (12.23) (12.19) (12.24) (12.32) (4.29) (1.35) 
Observations 11,769 11,769 11,769 11,769 11,769 11,769 11,769 13,583 2,723 
Adjusted R2 .623 .622 .622 .622 .622 .622 .623 .615 .885 
• p < .05; •• p < .01; ••• p < .001; two-tailed tests.  
* Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include firm and year fixed effects, and models 1-8 also include community fixed 
effects. 
† Community-level analysis of contributions received by local nonprofits from 1987 to 2002. Within this time period, we did not have 
a sufficient number of community-level observations of Olympic Games to include the Olympics indicators. For Super Bowls, 
national conventions, and different disaster types, however, this supplementary analysis shows patterns highly similar to those of our 
primary (firm-level) models.  
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Table 3. Fixed-effects Models Examining the Persistence of Post–event Effects* 
Variable Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Olympics      
Olympics in past 4 years 1.39•     
 (.60)     
Olympics in past 6 years  1.30•    
  (.53)    
Olympics in past 8 years   .21   
   (.57)   
Olympics in past 4-6 years    1.11• .69 
    (.56) (.69) 
Olympics in past 8-10 years     -.37 
     (.75) 
National conventions      
National convention in past 4 years .51•     
 (.22)     
National convention in past 6 years  .15    
  (.22)    
National convention in past 8 years   -.07   
   (.24)   
National convention in past 4-6 years    .23 .28 
    (.23) (.24) 
 National convention in past 8-10 years     .19 
     (.27) 
Other event effects      
Olympics at t+2 1.41 1.37 1.1 1.70• 1.54 
 (.82) (.82) (.87) (.83) (.88) 
Olympics at t 2.01• 2.04• 1.69• 2.09•• 1.92• 
 (.79) (.79) (.81) (.79) (.84) 
Olympics at t–2    1.87• 1.70• 
    (.78) (.83) 
National convention at t+2 .08 .02 -.12 .15 .15 
 (.30) (.32) (.33) (.31) (.31) 
National convention at t .17 .08 -.05 .16 .23 
 (.27) (.28) (.30) (.26) (.28) 
National convention at t–2    .53• .59• 
    (.26) (.28) 
Super Bowl at t+1 .30 .40 .39 .11 .22 
 (.58) (.57) (.60) (.60) (.62) 
Super Bowl at t .85• .86• .88• .86• .86• 
 (.42) (.42) (.42) (.42) (.42) 
Super Bowl at t–1 -.70 -.63 -.55 -.55 -.47 
 (.53) (.51) (.51) (.51) (.52) 
Major disaster at t -.29 -.38 -.34 -.35 -.32 
 (.34) (.33) (.33) (.33) (.34) 
Major disaster at t–1 -.65• -.63• -.65• -.66• -.66• 
 (.32) (.32) (.32) (.32) (.32) 
Medium disaster at t .32 .24 .29 .27 .27 
 (.27) (.27) (.27) (.27) (.27) 
Medium disaster at t–1 .03 .03 -.05 .04 .04 
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 (.27) (.27) (.27) (.27) (.27) 
Small-scale disaster at t -.00 .01 .00 -.02 -.02 
 (.18) (.18) (.18) (.18) (.18) 
Small-scale disaster at t–1 .32• .36• .36• .34• .35• 
 (.16) (.16) (.16) (.16) (.16) 
Constant -13.94 -12.63 -13.21 -13.18 -14.07 
 (12.33) (12.38) (12.48) (12.36) (12.50) 
Adjusted R2 .623 .623 .622 .623 .623 
• p < .05; •• p < .01; ••• p < .001; two-tailed tests.  
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Models include controls and firm, year, and community fixed effects. 
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Table 4. Fixed-effects Models Predicting Corporate Philanthropic Contributions (H3-H6)* 
Variable 
Model 15: 
History of 
philanthropy 
Model 16: 
Consumer 
orientation 
Model 17: 
Local 
network 
cohesion 
Model 18: 
Economic 
strength of 
community 
Interaction terms     
Olympics at t+2 × History of philanthropy .25    
 (.26)    
Olympics at t × History of philanthropy .31•    
 (.13)    
Olympics at t–2 × History of philanthropy .14    
 (.11)    
National convention at t × History of philanthropy .01    
 (.04)    
National convention at t–2 × History of philanthropy .08•    
 (.04)    
Super Bowl at t × History of philanthropy .22•    
 (.08)    
Small disaster at t × History of philanthropy .03    
 (.03)    
Small disaster at t–1 × History of philanthropy .02    
 (.03)    
Olympics at t+2 × Consumer orientation  .24   
  (1.49)   
Olympics at t × Consumer orientation  1.65   
  (1.43)   
Olympics at t–2 × Consumer orientation  1.93   
  (1.37)   
National convention at t × Consumer orientation  .89   
  (.47)   
National convention at t–2 × Consumer orientation  .76   
  (.47)   
Super Bowl at t × Consumer orientation  .75   
  (.83)   
Small disaster at t × Consumer orientation  .25   
  (.33)   
Small disaster at t–1 × Consumer orientation  -23   
  (.30)   
National convention at t × Local network cohesion   3.93•  
   (2.00)  
National convention at t–2 × Local network cohesion   7.86••  
   (2.89)  
Super Bowl at t × Local network cohesion   .10  
   (2.60)  
Small disaster at t × Local network cohesion   2.05•  
   (1.02)  
Small disaster at t–1 × Local network cohesion   1.99•  
   (1.01)  
National convention at t × Local government revenue    .24 
    (.31) 
National convention at t–2 × Local government revenue    .10 
    (.33) 
Super Bowl at t × Local government revenue    1.12 
    (.70) 
Small disaster at t × Local government revenue    -.09 
    (.14) 
Small disaster at t–1 × Local government revenue    .01 
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    (.14) 
Individual variables     
History of philanthropy .16•••    
 (.02)    
Consumer orientation  -.30   
  (.37)   
Local network cohesion   -1.92••  
   (.67)  
Local government revenue    -.38 
    (.67) 
Olympics at t+2 2.97 1.32 1.74• 1.60• 
 (3.35) (1.01) (.85) (.80) 
Olympics at t -1.78 1.14 1.93• 2.03•• 
 (1.64) (1.99) (.76) (.76) 
Olympics at t–2 .08 .74 1.87• 1.71• 
 (1.28) (1.01) (.77) (.77) 
National convention at t+2 -.10 .10 .06 .11 
 (.50) (.30) (.30) (.30) 
National convention at t .04 -.40 -1.17 -4.07 
 (.34) (.36) (.98) (5.45) 
National convention at t–2 -.13 .06 -1.79•• -1.04 
 (.51) (.36) (.87) (5.76) 
Super Bowl at t+1 -1.12 .02 -.02 .20 
 (.74) (.60) (.62) (.60) 
Super Bowl at t -.33 .49 .60 -18.00 
 (.89) (.52) (.99) (11.67) 
Super Bowl at t–1 -1.26 -.54 -.56 -.48 
 (.82) (.50) (.52) (0.51) 
Small-scale disaster at t .32 -.08 -.44 1.47 
 (.30) (.23) (.37) (2.28) 
Small-scale disaster at t–1 -1.20 .27 -.38 .01 
 (.64) (.21) (.33) (2.22) 
Constant -17.4 -13.8 -27.1• -14.2 
 (16.6) (12.3) (13.6) (12.3) 
Observations 7,189 11,769 10,855 11,769 
Adjusted R2 .662 .623 .627 .623 
• p < .05; •• p < .01; ••• p < .001; two-tailed tests. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Models include controls and firm, year, and community fixed effects. In addition, 
model 15 controls for corporate foundation assets. 
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Table 5. The Effect of Super Bowls: Comparing Hosts, Bidders, and Non-Bidders* 
Variable Model 19 Model 20 
Hosting or bidding for upcoming event     
Hosting a Super Bowl in next 1-5 years  .41 .52 
 (.30) (.30) 
Made unsuccessful bid for a Super Bowl to take place in next 1-5 years .003 .06 
 (.28) (.28) 
Event in the current year     
Hosting Super Bowl in year t  .81• 
  (.40) 
Made unsuccessful bid for a Super Bowl to take place in year t  -.36 
  (.29) 
   
Constant -12.12 -12.89 
 (12.24) (12.25) 
Adjusted R2 .622 .623 
• p < .05; •• p < .01; ••• p < .001; two-tailed tests.  
* N = 11,769 firm-years (2,570 firms). Standard errors are in parentheses. Models include controls and firm, 
year, and community fixed effects. Firms in communities that made neither a successful nor an unsuccessful 
bid for a Super Bowl during the relevant period constitute the reference category. 
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Figure 1a. Corporate philanthropic contributions divided by firm sales in Los Angeles, 1974–1994. 
 
  
 
Figure 1b. Corporate philanthropic contributions divided by firm sales in Houston, 1986–1996. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Olympics 
National convention 
 
 
 
  
 73 
 
 
Figure 1c. Corporate philanthropic contributions divided by firm sales in the Twin Cities, 1988–
1996. 
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Figure 2. Event types and magnitudes: A typology of event effects. 
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STRONG POSITIVE EFFECT 
 
 Temporal dynamics: Strong short-term 
effect as well as significant pre-event 
and lingering post-event effects. 
 
 
 Example: Olympic Games 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEGATIVE EFFECT 
 
 Temporal dynamics: Negative effect in 
the short-term aftermath of the event; 
because the event is unplanned, there 
are no pre-event effects. 
 
 Example: Large-scale natural disasters 
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MODEST POSITIVE EFFECT 
 
 Temporal dynamics: Modest positive 
effect limited to the short term; pre-
event and long-term post-event effects 
are relatively weak. 
 
 
 Example: Super Bowl, national 
conventions 
 
 
 
 
 
MODEST POSITIVE EFFECT 
 
 Temporal dynamics: Modest positive 
effect in the short-term aftermath of 
the event; because the event is 
unplanned, there are no pre-event 
effects. 
 
 Example: Small-scale natural disasters  
 
 
 
 
 
